

# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows



Indicator 2	Theory	Practice
Capital flows * Degree of mobility * Direction of flows * Correlation with % $\Delta$ GDP	In a world of perfectly mobile K, capital flows from where it is abundant to where it is scarce and where returns are highest (poor countries). Convergence in returns, factor prices, output and income.	Since 2000, China and Asia, more generally, lent to the US at very low interest rates, while sacrificing consumption at home. K-mobility does not imply convergence.

## ◆ Lucas paradox of K flows, direction and magnitude (Lucas 1990)

- Direction of flows
  - ◆ FDI flows from developed to developing economies
  - ◆ Financial K does not behave as per theory
- Magnitude of flows
  - ◆ K-flows do not always flow to where growth is higher
  - ◆ Asset-liability not correlated with GDP growth

# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

- Little K-inflow into E Asia between 1950-80 despite fast GDP growth and high K prodvty
- Considerable K flowed into Latin America despite its slower growth and low K prodvty




# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

<b>Indicator 3</b>	<b>Theory</b>	<b>Practice</b>
Covered interest rate arbitrage	Capital markets are integrated such that riskless arbitrage opportunities do not exist.	There are a lack of arbitrage opportunities, but that does not imply that a global capital market exists.

- ◆ Covered interest arbitrage holds for bond, not all assets
  - Assets not perfect substitutes
  - Risk differ and expectations matter
  - Tax rates differ; K controls

# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows


Indicator 4	Theory	Practice
Real interest rate differentials	If assets are perfect substitutes, then expected movements in currencies should equalize the differential in interest rates.	The condition does not always hold even among advanced economies because investors worry about risk of unforeseen exchange rate depreciation ( $\Delta E^e$ ); the rates do tend to move together



*Economist*, "School's brief: Capital goes global", 23 Oct 1997, p. 99-100.

# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

Indicator 5	Theory	Practice
Nominal interest rate differentials	Carry trade should not earn profits in a well-functioning international capital market.	The carry trade exploits nominal interest-rate differentials and works, yielding positive profits.



Carry trade: borrowing in low- $i$  mkt to invest in high- $i$  mkt to profit (with risk)

\* High  $i_{\text{Nom}}$  should reflect higher  $P$ ;  $l_c$  value must  $\downarrow$  for parity – strictly holds

\* Most **profitable strategy since mid-1990s was carry trade**. Study of returns with perfect foresight showed that info on nominal rate is more important than real  $i$

\* Nominal  $i$ -rate easier to target; currency traders are more concerned about the next few weeks than about  $L-T \Delta E$ .

\*  $E^F$  is naïve “forecast” of  $\Delta E$  and a bet on currency with high  $i$  is better than  $E^F$

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets


## ◆ Correlation of currency movements (against the \$)

### Strongest + correlation:

- \* In G10 economies,  $\uparrow P_H$  moves with  $\uparrow \$$
- \* In all mkts, sovereign risk (credit-default-swap spread) moves with  $\uparrow \$$ : implies widening CDS spread ( $\uparrow$  risk) and  $\uparrow \$$  value



### Strongest - correlation:

- \* Low  $i_H$ ,  $\$$ -inflow,  $\downarrow \$$
- \* Currencies negatively correlated with short-term  $i$ -rates (proxy for the carry trade)



# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

Indicator 6	Theory	Practice
Occurrence of bubbles and financial crisis	If markets are efficient and well-functioning (and regulated), then the occurrence of bubbles and financial crisis should lessen.	Bubbles contradict efficient mkts



# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

## ✦ Questioning benefits of financial integration

### ◆ Finance

- What is the function of the financial sector?
- What has happened with finance?

Modern finance: highly leveraged, lightly regulated, market-based system of allocating capital (dereg, tech innovation and mobile K)

### ◆ Recent financial crises


- Asian financial crisis
- Dotcom bubble
- GFC
- 2023 bank runs (US, Switzerland)



# Interest and E Rates and K-Markets and Flows

## ◆ Concerns with finance

- High stock mkt valuations, loose regs (interrupted by GFC response)




Regulation is often pro-cyclical; 10 years before GFC, the US rolled back Depression-era bank regulations

2018: US began limiting regs on rules to largest banks; ↓ bank capital requirements

*Economist*, “Free exchange: What could possibly go wrong”, 27 Jan 2018, p. 64.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- Long-run asset returns



Over the very long run, it is housing, not equities which provide best returns

Equity returns are more volatile


Rate of return on assets is faster than GDP growth ( $r > g$ : supports Piketty's conclusion related to inequality).

*Economist*, "Free exchange: Many happy returns", 6 Jan 2018, p. 55.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- Comment on i-rate, return on assets (r), and growth (g)
  - ◆ (1):  $r > g$  real rate and real growth
  - ◆ Piketty: 20th century,  $\uparrow$  Y-inequality

Tech firms: highest margins, perhaps because of mkt power.



“Rarely in stock market history have so many investors made so much money from so few shares going up for so long. 37% of the rise in the value of all firms in the S&P500 index, 2013-18, was explained by 6 members: Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft and Netflix”. In China Alibaba and Tencent accounted for 28% of the rise in Chinese equities.

*Economist*, “Varieties of inequality: The great divergence”, 12 Mar 2016, p. 34-5

*Economist*, “Schumpeter: The tech sell-off”, 3 Nov 2018, p. 64.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- ◆ (2):  $i > g$  nominal  $i$  (risk-free  $r$ ) and GDP
  - ◆ Applies to debt (debt explosion)
  - ◆ Revenue, wages, tax receipts cannot keep pace with debt payments
  - ◆ Case in early 2000s and again 2022-3 (inflation  $\rightarrow \uparrow i \rightarrow i > g$ )



# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets


- Real vs nominal  $i$ 
  - ♦ Feb 2023: End of tight MP  $\rightarrow$   $\uparrow$  stock mkt valuation Why?
  - ♦ What matters is real  $i$ :  $i_{\text{real}} = i_{\text{nominal}} (4,5\%) - \text{inflation} (6,5\%)$ 
    - ♦  $i_{\text{real}} = -2\%$ : signal to  $\uparrow$  debt
    - ♦  $i$  is a forward-looking variable  
how much is owed at future date
    - ♦ Better indicator to compare is  
expected inflation at same date
    - ♦  $[i_{\text{real}}]_{t+1}$  (using expected  $P$ ) = 2%
  - ♦ Questions the logic of the stock mkt  
run-up in value



*Economist*, “Inflation: The doveish illusion”, 4 Feb 2023, p. 65.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ◆ Trends in real interest rates



Steadily falling real i-rates esp. in 1990s and at historic lows in 2017.

Reasons are not understood nor agreed upon. 3 potential reasons:

- Increased willingness to save (more supply of saving and lower investment)
- Structural change in economy (Asia’s saving behavior and the savings glut), ageing pop
- Actions of central bank lowered real i-rate (and low inflation even as economies began to grow)

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ✦ Debt


- ◆ Basics on debt
- ◆ Dangers of debt
- ◆ Trends
  - Debt ↑ from 246% of global GDP in 2000 to 286% of GDP in 2015
  - For every \$ of new output, the world puts out more than \$1 debt

Macro models have given little importance to debt/default even as credit grows faster than GDP

[https://www.economist.com/content/global\\_debt\\_clock](https://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock)

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- ◆ Developed economies, during GFC




*Economist*, “The dangers of debt: Lending weight”, Schools brief, 14 Sep 2013, pp. 66-7.




# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ◆ Debt levels, by type




# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ◆ Debt relative to GDP growth



# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- ◆ Before: falling i-rates, housing property boom, and credit bubble
- ◆ After: near zero rates and debt, weak growth, populist politics



Low real i-rate,  
high real housing  
prices.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ✦ Housing prices, i-rates and debt


In 2022, house prices started to fall after years of growth. Australian, Canada and Sweden faced the sharpest drops. Mortgage binges fuelled by near zero i-rates left countries with enormous HH debt.

HH debt as % of disposable income was 185% in Canada, 202% in Australia and 203% in Sweden. (Norway peaked at 199% in Jan 2021.)

Debt levels shrunk in countries hurt during the GFC, including the US, Ireland and Spain.

Housing busts and recessions from debt build-up tend to be more severe. Excessive leverage makes people more vulnerable to job losses, i-rate rises, and falling house prices as during the GFC.


As central banks ↑ rates at the fastest pace in 40+ years, mortgage debt was again exposed.



*Economist*, “Housing prices: The coming crunch”, 26 Nov 2022, p. 65.6.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets


## ◆ Emerging market debt



*Financial Times*, “Investors fear Turkey is harbinger of wider crisis as easy money ends”, 14 Aug 2018, p. 19.

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ◆ China and debt



China's accumulation of physical K underpinned by cheap land (for development), tax breaks and low-cost L.

Role of debt in the strategy:

- Preferential access to credit from the beginning (state banks to state firms)
- GFC slowed X-led growth and fiscal stimulus was a response.
  - Local officials ran up debt;
  - Land was seized for development;
  - building boom and infrastructure investment

2008-19: Debt ↑, 150% to 250% of GDP

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ✦ EME debt

*Economist*, “Next in Line”,  
Briefing on debt in  
developing countries, 2 May  
2020, 54-55.

### Rout 66

Selected emerging economies ranked on four measures of financial strength

1=strongest

Strongest Weakest

Country (with rank)	Public debt % of GDP, 2020*	Foreign debt % of GDP, 2020*	Cost of borrow- ing <sup>†</sup>	Reserve cover <sup>‡</sup>
1 Botswana	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue
2 Taiwan	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue
3 South Korea	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
4 Peru	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
5 Russia	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
6 Philippines	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
7 Thailand	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
8 Saudi Arabia	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
9 Bangladesh	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
10 China	Orange	Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue
11 Guatemala	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue
12 Vietnam	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue
13 Poland	Yellow	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue
14 Nigeria	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Orange	Dark Blue
15 Trinidad & Tob.	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue
16 Indonesia	Light Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Orange
17 UAE	Light Blue	Orange	Dark Blue	Light Blue
18 India	Orange	Dark Blue	Light Blue	Dark Blue
19 Czech Rep.	Light Blue	Orange	Dark Blue	Yellow
20 Paraguay	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue	Orange
21 Bolivia	Light Blue	Light Blue	Yellow	Orange
22 Kuwait	Dark Blue	Yellow	Dark Blue	Orange
23 Azerbaijan	Dark Blue	Orange	Light Blue	Yellow
24 Ivory Coast	Light Blue	Light Blue	Yellow	Light Blue
25 Malaysia	Orange	Yellow	Dark Blue	Yellow
26 Morocco	Orange	Light Blue	Dark Blue	Light Blue
27 Romania	Light Blue	Yellow	Dark Blue	Orange
28 Mexico	Orange	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue
29 Colombia	Yellow	Yellow	Light Blue	Orange
30 Brazil	Orange	Light Blue	Light Blue	Light Blue
31 Chile	Light Blue	Orange	Dark Blue	Orange
32 Dom. Rep.	Orange	Light Blue	Yellow	Yellow
33 Uruguay	Orange	Orange	Dark Blue	Light Blue

Country (with rank)	Public debt % of GDP, 2020*	Foreign debt % of GDP, 2020*	Cost of borrow- ing <sup>†</sup>	Reserve cover <sup>‡</sup>
34 Croatia	Orange	Orange	Light Blue	Light Blue
35 Qatar	Yellow	Red	Dark Blue	Yellow
36 Kazakhstan	Dark Blue	Red	Dark Blue	Orange
37 Egypt	Orange	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
38 Namibia	Light Blue	Yellow	Yellow	Orange
39 Uganda	Light Blue	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
40 Costa Rica	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	Orange
41 Ethiopia	Yellow	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
42 Kenya	Orange	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
43 Pakistan	Orange	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
44 Turkey	Light Blue	Orange	Yellow	Red
45 Iraq	Red	Light Blue	Orange	Light Blue
46 Senegal	Orange	Orange	Yellow	Orange
47 South Africa	Orange	Yellow	Light Blue	Orange
48 Ghana	Orange	Light Blue	Orange	Orange
49 Hungary	Orange	Red	Dark Blue	Orange
50 Jordan	Orange	Orange	Yellow	Orange
51 Panama	Yellow	Red	Dark Blue	Red
52 Gabon	Yellow	Yellow	Orange	Red
53 Ukraine	Orange	Yellow	Orange	Orange
54 Ecuador	Orange	Yellow	Red	Red
55 El Salvador	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange
56 Jamaica	Orange	Red	Light Blue	Orange
57 Argentina	Orange	Orange	Red	Orange
58 Oman	Orange	Red	Orange	Orange
59 Mongolia	Orange	Red	Orange	Orange
60 Tunisia	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange
61 Sri Lanka	Orange	Orange	Orange	Orange
62 Angola	Red	Orange	Red	Orange
63 Bahrain	Red	Red	Yellow	Red
64 Zambia	Red	Orange	Red	Red
65 Lebanon	Red	Red	Red	Orange
66 Venezuela	Red	Red	Red	Red

Sources: EIU; IMF; JPMorgan Chase; iShares; *The Economist*;  
central banks; Haver Analytics; World Bank; Finanzen.net



\*Forecast †Yield on hard-currency bond or real yield on local bond ‡Foreign-  
exchange reserves, relative to 2020 foreign-debt payments and current-account deficit

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets


## Comparison of debt

### Gov't debt as % of GDP

Moderate gov't debt before GFC, spikes with GFC, stabilizes and spikes again with covid response



Moderate gov't debt before / after GFC



Upper countries: high debt before and after GFC

Lower countries: low debt before/after both shocks




# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ✦ Debt comparisons, as % of GDP, by actor across country







Increasing overall debt;  
moderate private debt

Moderate overall debt



High overall debt;  
moderate gov't debt


High gov't debt



# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

## ✦ Capital controls

- ✦ Types and objectives
- ✦ Trends in use




*Economist*, special report: World Economy, “Political pressures: a question of trust”, 12 Oct, 2013



*Economist*, “Capital controls: cash cowed”, 6 Apr 2013, p. 71

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- ◆ Share of countries with no controls on capital



Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2011/06/09/why-are-capital-controls-so-popular-pub-44490>

# Interest rates, E, K-flows and Capital Markets

- ◆ Capital controls as theory of the 2<sup>nd</sup> best
  - Case against liberal K mkts
  - Case against K controls
- ◆ Effectiveness of controls: Chilean model
  - 1-yr deposit on 30% of non-equity K
    - ◆ Deposit K with CB without interest
    - ◆ High tax on K-flows other than FDI, esp if short-term K-inflow
  - K-inflows must stay 1 yr – discourage hedge funds
  - Limit int'al borrowing (fc borrowing)