# International Macroeconomics

Module 1. Macroeconomic accounting and exchange rate determination


ECN320 Macroeconomics III

August 2023


# 1. What is an open macroeconomy?


- 1.1 Open vs closed macroeconomy
- \* Treatment of external imbalances
- **#** Globalization
- 1.2 State of the international economy
- \* Trends in trade

Fin Times, "Embattled future of global trade policy", 13 May 2015, p. 9, by M. Wolf



• Trade balance, 2010 \$bn and export as % of GDP 2011







Source: *Economist*, Economic and Financial Indicators, "Trade Balance", 16 Apr 2011, p. 94

Economist, "International Trade: Boxed In", 8 Sep 2012, p. 59

- \* Trends in international capital flows
  - Foreign investment assets, % global GDP



- Capital flows to developing countries
  - Foreign investment, by types, and relative to GDP
  - Importance of remittances: an approx for L migration?



Economist, "The world as a single machine", survey of manufacturing, 20 Jun 1998, p. 3-5 Economist, "Remittances: Like manna from heaven", 5 Sep 2015, p. 65-6.

800

600

400

200

Remittances

Foreign aid

10

Portfolio flows


14\*

\*Estimate

1.3 National income accounting: open / closed economy Y = C + I + G + (X - M)

- ★ Meaning of balance-of-trade (BOT)? +/— BOT
- \* What are a country's macro policy objectives?
- **★** BOT: (X M)
  - BOT's relation to domestic macroeconomy
  - Interpreting +/- BOT

• Example of US-EU BOT (current account balance)



Trump's concern with BOT:

US has a +BOT with EU (deficit in trade in goods) but surpluses in trade in services, net transfers and smaller surplus from the net income (US firms' profit in the EU) and EU spending on licensing fees for US tech.

Schmieding, H., "How Trump gets trade and Europe wrong", 10 Jul 2018, https://www.theglobalist.com/trump-trade-war-tariffs-european-union-china/

1.4 Trends in BOT = 
$$(S^P - I) - (G - \tau)$$

**Current-account balances, % of GDP** 




Economist, "Current-account balances", 30 Sep 2008; "Economic and financial indicators", various issues.

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\* National savings and investment, % of GDP


Developed economies' savings rates



Asia: savings and investment, % of GDP



Savings, investment and BOT: savings glut or investment deficit?



but

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
- Savings, investment and CA balance, % of world GDP
  - Industrialized countries\*

Investment > savings


Both trending down

Negative CA balance

\*Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and the US



• EMEs and net oil exporting countries\*, % of world GDP



After mid-1990s

Savings > investment
Both trending up


### Positive CA balance

\*Hong Kong, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, India, S. Korea, Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Venezuela, and Mexico

• Savings and covid-19: UK households

In 2020, government provided stimulus of various sorts. HH saving soared.

In 2021, after covid lockdowns were lifted economies recovered, esp services provision (bars, restaurants). Unemployment was low and/or labor mkts were tight. Wages were increasing.



Source: *Economist*, "The economy: Hot but not overheating", 22 May 2021, p. 36-7.



- **\*** Government spending and taxes
  - Gross domestic savings, % of GDP




Asia's stockpile of savings is still big and getting bigger.
Net savings rates 35% of GDP per year over 30-yr period.


In early 2000s, US Fed Chief, Bernanke argued of "savings glut" flooding into US bond mkts depressing long-term real interest rates.

Underlying cause of housing booms in the US, Ireland and construction boom in Spain.

Source: Economist, "Asia's economy: Glut maximus", 23 Nov 2019, p. 66-7.


Gov't spending in developed economies, % of GDP





Source: Economist, "Taming Leviathan", Special report on the future of the state, 19 Mar 2011, p. 3-6.


## OECD gov't spending and taxation



Source: *Economist*, "The Economist at 175: Reinventing liberalism for the 21<sup>st</sup> century," 15 Sep 2018, p. 50.


Budget balances, developed economies, % of GDP

Economist, "Economic and financial indicators", various issues.






- ★ Macro imbalances: twin surpluses, +BOT and T > G
  - Case of China
    - Macro situation, pre-/post-GFC period
      - 2007: (X-M) = 10% of GDP; R accumulation
      - 2012: (X-M)  $\downarrow$  to 2% of GDP; I = 50% of GDP




Source: *Fin Times*, "Two cheers for China's rebalancing", 04 Apr 2012, p. 4.

Macroeconomic rebalancing




1st rebalancing: ↓ dependence on export for growth,  $\downarrow X$ ;  $\uparrow I$ 


2nd rebalancing:  $\downarrow I$ ;  $\uparrow C$  (but not enough) From 2018, \( \tau \) in services, services trade deficit  $\rightarrow \downarrow CA$ surplus



Source: World Bank database

• Investment, consumption and capital stock, % of GDP






After 2007, China needed to rebalance from X-led growth, along the coast, to I in inland areas.

↑ consumption but not enough to match supply - household income is a small share of GDP.

Investors put money in housing rather than factories, but gov't directed investment in infrastructure.

• Rebalancing for strategic, geopolitical reasons



Source: *Economist*, "Fortified but not enriched", briefing, China's place in the world economy, 28 May 2022, p. 13-5

Shift for self-reliance and sufficiency in high-tech products:


- China too dependent on liberal democracies esp, US
- Evidence of sanctions on Russia

Solar panel sector – 70% of prodn of raw mats used to manufacture solar cells, but also the cells themselves and the module onto which they are assembled.

Some sectors struggle to ↓ dependence – aviation and spacecraft sectors import 98% of components from West.

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Case of Germany



Sources: *Economist*, "Rebalancing the world economy: Germany", 9 Aug 2009 and "Germany: Are the black zero's days numbered?", 16 Nov 2019, p.23-4.

Germany's economic miracle reflects an obsession with budget balance commitment, "schwarze null" and low debt level (2010 "debt break" limited gov't structural deficit to 0.35% of GDP and no deficits in the 16 regions).

Germany counters that in 2019 it has had 9 years of growth & highest employ since reunification.

- Savings and private and state net investment, €mln
  - Savings investment gap
  - Private investment trends lower since 2000
  - ↓ net value of state assets: 2002-07 and after 2012



Downside: lowest ranking in infrastructure investment of any big, rich economy (roads, bridges and rail in poor state of repair, slow internet connection).

Sources: Economist, "German economy: No new deal", 14 Feb 2015, p. 19-20 and

"Public investment: The Germany that doesn't work", 17 Jun 2017, p. 24-5.



- Rebalancing within the Eurozone, 2004-07 and 2017
  - External imbalances: overall surplus 3.6% of GDP, \$442bn
  - Internal balancing: crisis countries stabilized



Ireland:  $\uparrow X$  and competitiveness

Greece: ↓C, I, M



- 1.5 Balance-of-payments (BOP)
- **\*** Macroeconomic identity:

BOP = BOT – net K-flow [K-out – K-in] - 
$$\Delta R \equiv 0$$

- BOP components: BOT, K-account and  $\Delta R$
- Relationships among components
- **\*** BOP, BOT and policy considerations
  - Dangers with persistent +/- BOT
  - BOP crisis

- \* Trends in BOP: BOT and K acct
  - US, OECD and LDCs

#### **Current acct balances**


- U.S. CAB
- MON-U.S. INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES CAB
- ELDCS' CAB


#### Capital acct balances

■ U.S. KAB


■ NON-U.S. INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES' KAB
■ LDCS' KAB

Net K-inflows to US about 4% of GDP in 2003






Current and capital account (FDI flows): EU-China





The EU's –BOT with China is partially offset by net FDI inflows.

• Official reserves, excl. gold, selected countries, \$bln



US –BOT and Asian reserves






US -BOT is more than just China's +BOT

2003-04: CBs financed 83% of US – BOT; Asian CBs accounted for 86% of US -BOT

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• Official reserve positions: US and China, 1995-2008




Includes convertible foreign currency assets, SDR and reserve position in IMF, but excludes gold

Source: US Census Bureau




- 1.7 International reserve currency
- \* Role of money
- \* Purpose of reserves
- \* Necessary conditions
- \* Benefits and costs of \$ as a reserve
- **\*** Rivaling the \$


### Shift from UK sterling to US dollars



Network effect of dollar




• Indicators of strength (as a reserve currency)



reserve currency to any significant extent

Source: *Economist*, "The future of the dollar: Passing of the buck", Special report, 2 Dec 2004, p. 71-3; and "Banyan: The red and the green", 26 Apr 2014.


• Indicator of \$ weakness – US shifts from net lender to net debtor



2021: Next Generation EU scheme issued €20bn of eurozone bonds in stimulus; global €-payments in 2020 almost match \$ despite commodities being priced in \$

Source: *Economist*, "The international role of the euro: Euro visions", 26 Jun 2021, p. 59-60.

- Challenge by the yuan (renminbi)
  - China's economic position: \$ vs yuan
  - 2016: IMF includes yuan in SDR




Of the \$5trn traded in daily currency mkts in 2017, the \$ was on one side of 9 of 10 transactions.

Bonds issued by gov'ts or firms are mostly in \$ if not in local currency.

Source: *Economist*, "China: A longer march", Special report, the world economy, 3 Oct 2015, p. 12-4

• Share of activity in renminbi, % of toal, 2022-23




Renminbi's share of trade finance doubled, from 2% to 4.5%, since Russian invasion (left chart).

Cost of US \$ financing ↑ (right chart); China's currency is used to facilitate trade with Russia. The US \$ still accounted for 84% of world trade finance. China seeks to accelerate renminbi internationalization – suffered setback in 2015 when a devaluation led to capital flight. West's sanctions include barring major Russian financial institutions from using SWIFT. Russia has access to China's alternative to Swift (Cross-border interbank payment system, CIPs).

Financial Times, "Renminbi's share of trade finance doubles", 12 Apr 2023, p. 9.

US sanctions on Russia and pushback against \$



Trump administration \( \) the use of sanctions and the dollar's role in them. The dollar's use to extend the reach of US law and policy fit Trump's America first agenda. To others this was a political weapon and an abuse of US power. Russia and China, on the other end of the sanctions, expanded settlement of bilateral trade in their currencies. China also has ↑ use of sanctions for foreign policy purposes.

Tools used include sanctions, tariffs, trade negotiations and export controls. Secondary sanctions allow US gov't to penalise 3<sup>rd</sup> parties doing business with a sanctioned country.

Source: *Economist*, "Dethroning the dollar", 18 Jan 2020, p. 63-5; *Financial Times*, "Global trade: Currency warrior", by S. Fleming, 2 Jul 2019, p. 7.