

\* Large-country case: China

China's share of world consumption,


selected goods

China, % of world consumption 20112020 20 40 60 80 Iron ore (seaborne imports) Iron ore (total) Refined aluminium Refined copper Steel Refined nickel Coal Lead Pork Soyabeans Gold Silver Wheat Oil Beef and veal Natural gas Rice **Population GDP** Sources: BP; CRU Group; IMF; OECD; UN; World Bureau of Metal Statistics

*Economist*, "China and commodities: Material clout", 20 Nov 2021, p. 65-6.

#### H-O-S 2 x 2 x 2 Trade Model, continued . . .

• TOT: relation of prices in China and world prices




China's manu production is large relative to world. There is comovement between [P<sub>manu</sub>]<sub>China</sub> and  $[P_{commod}]_{Wld}$ . An  $\uparrow$  $[P_{manu}]_{China} \rightarrow \uparrow$ Q<sub>manu</sub> which, in turn, implies \( \) D for commodity input and  $\uparrow [P_{commod}]_{Wld}$ could suggest a large-country case.


Source: Economist, "Free exchange: Inflated claims", 5 Sep 2015, p. 67.

#### H-O-S 2 x 2 x 2 Trade Model, continued . . .

- \* Declining TOT from commodity exporter perspective
  - Industrial commodity-price index, real \* \$ terms



- 6.2 Labor mkt performance: wages, employment, income
- \* Factors affecting wages
  - Trends in L productivity growth and avg wages, 1999-2013
    - OECD average




Note: Wage growth is calculated as a weighted average of year-on-year growth in average monthly real wages in 36 economies (for a description of the methodology, see Appendix I). Index is based to 1999 because of data availability.

Sources: ILO Global Wage Database; ILO Trends Econometric Models, Apr. 2014. Data accessible at: www.ilo.org/gwr-figures

Source: ILO Global Wage Report 2014/15.


• Productivity-wage gap, selected countries disaggregated, 1986-2013



Source: Sharpe & Uguccioni, "Decomposing the productivity-wage nexus", *Int'al Produty Monitor*, 2017(32).



Asian labor markets




The %\Delta wage growth, on average, is higher than prodvty in China and other fast-growing Asian countries.

Where L prodvty is low and wage growth is higher can signal a loss of competitiveness.

Source: Economist, "Asian Labour Markets", 27 Aug 2011

Market power-bargaining power: L union strength




OECD economies decline in L-union membership

- \$\dagger\$ by \frac{1}{2} from 1980 to 2011
- UK: wage premium of L union ↓ from 18% to 2%

Countries most exposed to globalization experienced biggest loss in L-union power
Shift from manu to services affected union strength/membership too

Source: Economist., "Organised labour: Unions, Inc.", 6 Apr 2013, p. 58-9.

\* Issue 1: Wage flexibility, inequality and employment




The more equal are wages, the higher is unemployment.

The less equal is pay, the less unemployment.

Economist, "Economics focus: Jobs and wages revisited", 17 Aug 1996, p. 72.


- \* Issue 2. How does N-S trade affect wage gaps (inequality)?
  - Implications for North
    - \(\gamma\) W-inequality, skilled vs unskilled L



Poor areas within a country fared worse than richer areas (unskilled L worse off relative to skilled L)

Source: Economist, "Two tales of trade", 17 Jul 1997

• Regional wage disparity \( \) in developed economies



L mobility has a positive and negative side:


- Allows workers to move to where wages are higher and where jobs are available
- Regions negatively hit by recession or structural changes can be drained of talented workers (youth)

Regional disparities within a country are associated with a concentration of losses

Industry concentration has made regional disparities worse

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• \preprint returns to labor, but across all countries




Since 2003 and comparing before and after the global financial crisis, the returns to labor have decreased across all types of countries (rich and poor)

Spain is the exceptional case.

Source: Economist.com, "Focus: Labour productivity", 19 Feb 2013

• Labor costs, share of national income




- ↑ L prodvty no longer implies a broad ↑ pay In 1930s-40s, income equality improved in US and Europe.
- ↑ income gap betweenNorth and South
- except for Japan, S.Korea and Taiwan

1980s: Trend goes into reverse. Emerging mkts grow faster than developed;

† income gaps within countries.

- Trends in returns to labor, North Trends in returns to capital, North






Greater reliance on trade is factor affecting \( \preceq \) L share; regions/industry exposed to globalization (import competition) had bigger \( \t L \) share




- Implications for South
  - Wage growth in emerging Asia



Wage growth fastest in most trade reliant countries.

Source: Economist, "Vietnam's economy: Plus one country", 04 Sep 2010

High W-inequality



Source: Economist, "Economics focus: Trade and wages", 7 Dec 1996

• Measure of income inequality, highest in South



Model assumes no int'al K, L mobility which is false.

How does K mobility affect wage inequality in South?

• Disaggregating income inequality in Africa, by country


Within Africa the most unequal countries are in southern Africa where the top 10<sup>th</sup> income decile earn 65% of national income, on average.

Economist, "Inequality in Africa: All right for some", 15 Apr 2023, p. 32.







- Issue 3. Which is the bigger driver, of change on [P<sub>L</sub>], skilled or unskilled L, or employment?
  - Trade
  - Technological change
    - IT revolution (skills-biased)
    - Global supply chain more fragmented and mobile
    - AI and robotics?
    - Green transition?




Source: *Economist*, "Economics focus: Automatic reaction", 9 Sep 2010.

• Relative productivity: advanced vs developing/emerging economies






• China: tech, K and wages




Source: Economist, "Automatic for the people", Briefing on China's growth prospects", 14 Aug 2021, p. 14-6.

- Issue 4. Has income converged between N and S, e.g., that poor economies grow faster than rich ones?
  - Gerschenkron (1950s) and Abromovitz (1970s): imitation is easier than innovation and returns to K highest where K is scarce
  - GDP growth
    - One country, one observation
    - Proportional to population

Source: *Economist*, "Global economic inequality: More or less equal?", 13 Mar 2004, p. 73-5.




#### Poverty reduction



Source: Economist, "Global hipsters: Flat-white world", 7 Nov 2020, p. 51-2.

• Economic growth and GDP per cap, % median economy




Source: IMF Source: Economist, Economic and financial indicators, 13 Apr 2013, p. 85.

Evidence for convergence among lowest GDP countries was weak between 1960s-1990s but became stronger because of China's decades of double-digit growth; technological changes enabled firms to create int'al supply chains. The GFC, euro crisis, Trump's trade war and Covid-19 now mean EMEs must experience sustained increase in productivity (within and across sectors).

Source: Economist, "Free exchange: "Close calls", 3 Aug 2019, p. 64.

• Trends in GDP and trade – catch up






The 2010s were a rough decade but still were good in terms of catch up for EMDEs. It is just that the 2000s were so much better. China's pull factor in the 2000s played a big part – i.e., China played a key role in international supply chains.

Source: Economist, "A mixed-up slowdown", Briefing on emerging economies, 31 Jul 2021, p. 13-5.

• Copying China's development model getting harder



In 2022, China's GDP/cap was 28% of the US's (half of Poland's) but had biggest total GDP. If its GDP/cap doubled to match Poland's, then its GDP total would be bigger than US-EU combined.

Its GDP/cap went from 2% to 28% from 1980-2022. S.Korea had 28% of US in 1988 and 57% in 2007 (where Poland is). In 20 years, China could reach that level.

Fin Times, "We should not call 'peak China' just yet", 20 Sep 2023, p. 17.

Supply-chain trade allowed countries to side-step the process of building an industrial base from scratch. Cheap labor and proximity to big markets lured foreign plants. China as the head of "factory Asia" put Asia at the center of a supply chain that sparked a commodity boom helping Latin America and Africa who were not linked into the chain.

• Income convergence, emerging market economies (EMEs)




Earlier research expected that the BRIC countries would converge with a productivity frontier such as the US.

The thinking shifted toward the idea that economies converge not towards a global leader but with their neighbors or peers (e.g., convergence within regional blocs).

World Bank (2020) study finds that the forces at work are more complex than "closeness to neighbors" – look at several indicators.

• Income convergence in EMEs: vs advanced economies and across EMEs



World Bank, "Global productivity: Trends, Drivers and Policies", finds 5 country groupings based on productivity performance: 3 groups of poor countries; a 4<sup>th</sup> group with larger EMEs with unfulfilled potential (Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico and South Africa); 5<sup>th</sup> is the most successful group of rich countries and 16 EMEs (right-side graph).

Source: Economist, "Economic convergence: Club class", 15 Aug 2020, p. 59-60.



- \* Four possible sources of growth in GDP per person
  - Structural transformation: moving L from A sector (overmanned fields) to M sector (more productive factories)
  - Capital deepening: adding more K (machinery) per unit of L in any sector
  - Tech diffusion: use of existing tech more widely across firms, industry or sectors, improving the use of K, L
  - Tech advances: innovations that lead to new products, processing method or business organization