ECN 371 (spring 2016)

Selected journal articles and book chapters

ECN 371 home page: https://athene.umb.no/emner/pub/ECN371/

Course readings – ECN 371 spring 2016

Assigned readings:

Dean, T.J. & R.L. Brown (1995): Pollution regulation as a barrier to new firm entry: Initial evidence and implications for future research. *Academy of Management Journal*, **38**(1):288-301.

Hoel, M. (2001): International trade and the environment: how to handle carbon leakage. Pp. 176-191 (Ch. 7) in Folmer, H., H. Landis Gabel, S. Gerking & A. Rose, *Frontiers of Environmental Economics*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Kolstad, C. (2000): Marget failure: Public bads and externalities. Pp. 78-98 (Ch. 5) in Kolstad, C. *Environmental Economics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Lévêque, F. (1996): The regulatory game. Pp. 31-51 (Ch. 3) in Lévêque, F. Environmental Policy in Europe, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Nyborg, K. (2003): The Impact of Public Policy on Social and Moral Norms: Some Examples. *Journal of Consumer Policy*, **26**:258-277.

Ostrom, E. (2000): Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **14**(3):137-158.

Palmer, K. W.E. Oates & P.R. Portney (1995): Tightening Environmental Standards: The Benefit-Cost or the No-Cost Paradigm? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **9**(4):119-132.

Polasky, S. & E. Romstad (2010): An auction mechanism for optimal conservation under asymmetric information. Manuscript submitted to *Environmental and Resource Economics*.

Porter, M.E. & C. van der Linde (1995): Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **9**(4):97-118.

Romstad, E. (2005): *Game Theory and Resource Allocation Mechanisms*. Lecture note in ECN 371, Department of Economics & Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway (http://athene.umb.no/emner/pub/ECN371/notes/ram.html as of October 13, 2006).

Romstad, E. (2006): *Monitoring Issues*. Lecture note in ECN 371, Department of Economics & Resource Management, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway (http://athene.umb.no/emner/pub/ECN371/notes/monitor.html as of Ocotber 13, 2006).

Romstad, E. (2013): Truthful revelation in conservation auctions. Paper submitted to Resource and Energy Economics.

Romstad, E. (2012): *Dynamic Efficiency*. Lecture note in ECN 371, School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Ås, Norway (http://athene.umb.no/emner/pub/ECN371/notes/dynamic.html – also in compendium).

Sandmo, A. (2000): The Tax Structure and the Environment. Pp. 90-108 (Ch. 5) in Sandmo, A. *The Public Economics of the Environment*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Sandmo, A. (2000): The Double Dividend and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds. Pp. 109-129 (Ch. 6) in Sandmo, A. *The Public Economics of the Environment*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

Segerson, K. & N. Li (1999): Voluntary Approaches to environmental protection. Pp. 273-306 (Ch. 7) in Folmer H. & T. Tietenberg (eds.) *The International Yearbook of Environmental and Resource Economics 1999/2000*, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Shogren, J.F. (2002): A behavioral mindset on environment policy. *Journal of Socio Economics*, **31**:355-369.

Sterner, T. (2003): Policy Issues and Potential Solutions. Pp. 432-477 (Ch. 32) in Sterner, T. *Policy Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Management*, RFF Press, Washington DC.

Tietenberg, T. (2006): Tradable Permits, Principle and Practice. RFF Press, Washington DC, pp. 1-47.

Vatn, A. (2005): Chapter 13: Policy and Policy Measures. Pp. 366-414 in Vatn, A., 2005. *Institutions and the Environment*. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.

Vatn, A., L.R. Bakken, P. Botterweg, H. Lundeby, E. Romstad, P.K. Rørstad & A.Vold (1997): Regulating Nonpoint-source Pollution from Agriculture, An Integrated Modeling Analysis. *European Review of Agricultural Economics*, **26**(2):207-229.

Vatn, A. & D.W. Bromley (1997): Externalities – A Market Model Failure. Environmental and Resource Economics, 9(1):135-151.

Cursory readings:

Barrett, S. (1994): Self-enforcing international agreements, CSERGE working paper 92-32, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Cherry, T.L. & J.F. Shogren (2005): Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security. *Environmental and Resource Economics*, **31**(3): 349-367.

Coase, R. (1960): The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44.

Dahlman, C.J. (1979): The Problem of Externality. The Journal of Law and Economics 22:141-162.

Gibbons, R. (1997): An introduction to applicable game theory. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **11**(1):123-149.

Goulder, L.H. (2013): Markets for Pollution Allowances: What Are the (New) Lessons? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **27**(1):87-102.

Greenstone, M., J.A. List & C. Syverson (2012): The Effects of Environmental Regulation on the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing. NBER working paper # w18392, New York. (http://www.nber.org/papers/w18392 not in compendium – read summarically)

Hahn, R.W. (1989): Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, **3**(2):95-114.

Polasky S. & E. Romstad (2010): An Auction Mechanism for Optimal Conservation under Asymmetric information, Revise and resubmit, *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*. (document under revision, revised version available online on course web when finished).

Rasmusen, E. (1989): Chapter 11: Auctions. In Rasmusen, E.: *Games and Information: An Introduction to Game theory*. Basil Blackwell, New York, NY.

Romstad, E., (2003): Team approaches in reducing nonpoint source pollution. *Ecological Economics*, 47(2003)71-78.

Sandel, M.J. (1997): It's Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute (with replies). Pp. 355-358 in Stavins, R.(ed.): *Economics of the Environment. Selected Readings*, Harvard University.

Shavell, S. (1987): The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent. *American Economic Review*, 77(4):584-592.

Weitzman, M.L. (1974): Prices vs. Quantities. Review of Economic Studies, 41(4):477-491.