



# ECN 371: Exercise set 1 - suggested answers

1. a. (i) Technically feasible: All points inside or on the boundary of the production possibility set, i.e. A, B, D and E.
  - (ii) Technically efficient: Points D and E (because it is not possible to get more of one of the products without getting less of the other). Note that B is not technically efficient. Why?
  - (iii) Economically efficient: Point E (because it is where the price line is tangent to the product transformation curve).
  - b. Doubling  $p_1$  gives the following price line:  $-\frac{2p_1}{p_2}$ , which is twice as steep as the initial price line ( $-\frac{p_1}{p_2}$ ). Consequently, one produces more of  $y_1$  and less of  $y_2$ .
2. a. Allocation O is not efficient because it is possible for both members of the economy to get more without the other getting less.
  - b. The region for Pareto improvement is given by the shaded area northeast of O:



- c. We would never observe allocation A given our assumptions because both individuals would increase their utility moving from A to the point M.
- d. It would be possible to move to B from O if we allow for side payments (see below):



Here, individual 2 gains OS, while individual 1 loses SB. As  $OS > SB$ , individual 2 can pay individual 1 the amount SB to make him/her indifferent with his/her initial allocation, and individual 2 would be left with a surplus  $OS - SB$ .

- e. Outcome B is not a likely outcome for two reasons. First, total wealth is larger in any point located on the segment of the region for Pareto improvements. Second, with the compensation SB, individual 1 is equally well off as he/she was initially. Knowing the large gains to individual 2, it is at least possible for 1 to demand a slightly larger compensation than SB. This would make both individuals better off than they were initially at allocation O.

3. a. The profit function,  $\pi = py - (ay + by^2)$

- b. Differentiate the profit function by  $y$  and set equal to zero (First Order Condition, FOC), then solve for  $y$ :

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial y} = p - a - 2by = 0 \Rightarrow -2by = -(p - a) \Rightarrow y = \frac{p - a}{2b}$$


A check of the second order condition (SOC) reveals that it is everywhere negative  $\frac{\partial(p - a - 2by)}{\partial y} = -2b < 0$ , i.e., we have a global maximum where the FOC holds.

- c. Before drawing the graphs, consider the TR and TC functions.

$$TR = py \Rightarrow MR = \frac{\partial TR}{\partial y} = p$$

$$TC = ay + by^2 \quad MC = \frac{\partial TC}{\partial y} = a + 2by$$

which graphed yields



As MC crosses MR from below and SOCs hold everywhere, it appears that the optimal solution is at  $y = 6$ . Inserting the parameters in the solution to part b gives the same

answer:  $y = \frac{p - a}{2b} = \frac{4 - 1}{2 \cdot 0.25} = 6$

The corresponding profits are  $\pi = py - (ay + by^2) = 4 \cdot 6 - (1 \cdot 6 + 2 \cdot 0.25 \cdot 6^2) = 9$

d. The profit function with the emission tax

$$\pi = py - (ay + by^2) - tz = py - (ay + by^2) - t \frac{1}{2} y^2 = (p - a)y - (b + \frac{1}{2}t)y^2$$

e. Solving for the FOCs of the expression in part d:

$$\frac{\partial \pi}{\partial y} = p - a - (2b + t)y = 0 \Rightarrow -(2b + t)y = -(p - a) \Rightarrow y = \frac{p - a}{2b + t}$$

f. Inserting parameter values yields:  $y = \frac{p - a}{2b + t} = \frac{4 - 1}{(2 \cdot 0.25) + .5} = 3$


The corresponding profits:

$$\pi = py - (ay + by^2) - tz = (p - a)y - (b + \frac{1}{2}t)y^2 = (4 - 1)3 - ((2 \cdot 0.25) + 0.5 \cdot 0.5)3^2 = 2.25$$

h. Graphical solution with the tax

The TR-function is the same, while the total costs become

$$TC = ay + (b + \frac{1}{2}t)y^2 \quad MC = \frac{\partial TC}{\partial y} = a + (2b + t)y$$



The optimal solution with the tax (rotates the MC curve in this problem) is  $y = 3$ .

i. The maximum allowance on emissions of 12.5 units involves solving the following Lagrangian:

$$L = py - (ay + by^2) + \lambda[12.5 - z] = py - ay - by^2 + \lambda[12.5 - \frac{1}{2}y^2]$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial y} = p - a - 2by - \lambda y = 0$$

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 12.5 - \frac{1}{2}y^2 = 0$$

After solving these FOCs simultaneously we get  $y = 5$  and  $\lambda = (4 - 1 - 2 \cdot 0.25 \cdot 5)/5 = 0.1$

Inserting the solution for  $y$  into the profit function yields :

$$\pi = py - (ay + by^2) = 4 \cdot 5 - (1 + 2 \cdot 0.25 \cdot 5^2) = 6.5$$

- j. When the emission cap (maximum allowance is expanded to 24), it suffices to see that the Lagrangian multiplier constraint

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 24 - \frac{1}{2}y^2 \leq 0$$

becomes non-binding vis-a-vis the solution in part c as  $y^2 \geq 48$  implies that  $y$  is larger than 6, the unconstrained solution. Hence, the constraint is non-binding and the value is the same as for the unconstrained solution. (Those who doubt the result, work out the problem using Kuhn-Tucker).